The idea that people who favour a united Ireland should say nothing on the subject is ludicrous. There simply can’t be an important area of social, political and economic controversy on which there is some form of omerta.
But vacuous and ill thought out rhetoric about a united Ireland is more or less useless in present circumstances. In fact it can be, in the true sense of the phrase, worse than useless. It aggravates things to no useful end.
In the centenary year of formal partition, it is as well to remember that a majority on both sides of the border voted to accept the Good Friday Agreement and to elevate it to the status of binding international law.
South of the border we committed ourselves to the principle that the status of Northern Ireland depends exclusively on the expressed will of a majority of the people in Northern Ireland. Equally importantly, we committed ourselves to the proposition that it is equally legitimate for people in Northern Ireland to see and define themselves as Irish, British or both.
The recent census in the North will probably reveal that Catholics and Protestants are now numerically equal – around 46 to 47% each. We are told that it will probably reveal that Catholics out-number Protestants in four of the six northern counties and in the city of Belfast.
This demographic transformation was bound to have an unsettling effect on the unionist and loyalist communities. And that was before the Irish Sea goods border. The raison d’etre of Northern Ireland was a claimed right to opt out of an independent Irish state leaving the United Kingdom. The unionist psychology is bound to be deeply concerned at the prospect of becoming a minority even in Northern Ireland.
But a sectarian head-count in the North does not predict how a majority of voting age there would vote in an early referendum on Irish unity.
It still seems that a majority of voting age would vote in any immediate referendum by a margin of 60:40 or perhaps even 2:1 to remain in the UK.
It is argued, and with some force, that speculation about the outcome of a referendum is pointless unless there is a clear picture of the question on which people would be asked to vote.
And that is the nub of the question. What form would or could Irish unity take? Unless a clear model of Irish unity emerges, it is highly likely that a majority in Northern Ireland will vote for the status quo.
That poses the very serious question as to just how a model of Irish unity with any chance of receiving majority approval in Northern Ireland could be developed, articulated and put up for decision in a simple binary Yes-No referendum.
It seems wholly illusory to expect unionists with any electoral base to come to some negotiating table with nationalist Ireland for the purpose of developing a united Ireland model for decision in such a referendum.
Why would any unionist politician become involved in such a process? If one opposes a united Ireland it would be political suicide to engage in a dialogue concerning its architecture. While some well-meaning amateurs might somehow be persuaded to engage in such a process, no real unionist politician could take that risk.
If the foregoing is true, nationalist Ireland must face the fact that its aspiration for a united Ireland will, at best, have to be articulated in a unilateral rather than bilateral process.
It seems to me much more probable that Irish unity would come about in a gradual process than in some form big bang German unification.
If the British identity of a large number of northern citizens is to be preserved in any way, a confederal model seems more apt to achieve that end. Unionists would not have to negotiate an irreversible plunge into a unitary state. Parity of esteem and reconciliation would, in my view, be far more easily achieved in an Ireland where sovereignty was pooled and shared between two jurisdictions.
Assuming that people in the North eventually clearly see the advantages of being part of the EU single market, it may well be that their economic interests will develop to the point that it makes sense to join the south in sharing membership of the EU in some confederal structure.
If confederation is more feasible and less threatening, why can’t we work on such a model and put it out there for discussion? It does not connote extinction of identity for unionists. It can be discussed without loss of face. Loyalists can kick the tyres of such a model over time without the taint of Lundy-ism.
That course seems wiser than airily fanning embers of fear into flame.
